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I. INTRODUCTION
Alaska is a region of abundant natural resources and vast lands. Un-
fortunately, modem legal disputes continue to originate from historic rival
claims to this bounty. Alaskan Natives have long struggled to maintain
some semblance of control over their ancient lands in the midst of settle-
ment by competing alien cultures. After Alaskan statehood, interest in the
region resulted in Congress adopting the Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act (ANCSA). However, in adopting ANCSA Congress simply added fuel
to the fire causing additional problems in the wake of questionable solu-
tions to the Native land claims.
ANCSA instituted an unfamiliar corporate system on the Alaskan
Natives. The creation of village and regional corporations imposed artifi-
cial property divisions and adversarial relationships among Native groups.
Thus, the opportunity arose for non-natives to exploit tensions between
opposing tribal entities. Furthermore, ANCSA fabricated disruption where
it did not exist before, namely among competing Native organizations.
ANCSA was born out of convenience, paving the way for the American
development of Alaska without concern for the subsequent Native struggle
to adapt. In Leisnoi v. Stratman, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals exam-
ined the legal structure of ANCSA and some of the inherent difficulties
that have unfortunately persisted.1
The foremost objective of this note is an analysis of Leisnoi v.
Stratman as a "real world" application of the complexities of ANCSA.
Leisnoi v. Stratman exemplifies the difficulties inherent in ANCSA which
have led to extensive litigation, despite the contrary intentions of Con-
gress. In a narrower scope, Leisnoi looks at the hardships associated with
the double land ownership regime instituted under ANCSA. The case con-
cers common disputes between regional and village corporations in re-
gard to the twenty-two million acres of land that are "dually owned" under
ANCSA.2 Leisnoi, a village corporation, contested the regional
corporation's authority to permit the extraction of sand and gravel by a
local rancher, Omar Stratman.3 According to the Ninth Circuit in Leisnoi
*. J.D., expected 2000, University of Montana School of Law.
1. Leisnoi, Inc. v. Stratman, 154 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 1998).
2. Id. at 1065.
3. Id.
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v. Stratman, the case is yet another example "that pits surface-estate owner
against subsurface-estate owner."
4
Section II introduces the development of ANCSA. Section III ex-
plores the almost unbelievable vendetta between Omar Stratman and the
Native Village of Leisnoi. Section IV sets the legal stage by illustrating
the case law relative to the narrow legal issue of sand and gravel extrac-
tion under ANCSA. Section V fully analyzes the Ninth Circuit opinion
from Leisnoi v. Stratman and the court's evaluation of Leisnoi's argu-
ments. Finally, Section VI concludes by relating the narrow example of
Leisnoi v. Stratman back to the larger issue of the failure of ANCSA to
provide a satisfactory solution to Alaskan land disputes.
II. BACKGROUND: ALASKA NATIVE CLAIMS SETrLEMENT ACT
By enacting ANCSA in December 1971,' Congress responded to the
"immediate need for a fair and just settlement of all claims by Natives and
Native groups of Alaska."6 Alaska's unique history as part of the United
States began when then Secretary of State William Seward negotiated a
land purchase from Russia in 1867. Subsequent gold discoveries induced
Congress to recognize the region as a territory but further assimilation had
to wait. Finally, statehood was precipitated by World War II, which de-
manded a greater military presence in the Pacific. Alaska was accepted
into the Union on January 3, 1959.' Claims to Alaska's lands had been a
growing problem even before statehood. With the addition of federal
claims to Alaska's lands and natural resources, a resolution with the Alas-
kan Natives was unavoidable. However, the discovery of oil reserves in
Prudhoe Bay pushed Congress toward a hasty solution.8 ANCSA was cre-
ated to resolve land disputes between the federal government, the state of
Alaska, Alaska Natives and non-Native settlers.9 Congress deemed that a
legislative act, rather than a judicial settlement, was the "only practical
course to follow."' 0
Despite Congress's intention to reduce litigation, ANCSA proved to
be problematic." Outstanding land claims threatened the development of
4. Id.
5. Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-
1629(e) (1994)).
6. 43 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (1994).
7. 1 NEw ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 202 (15th ed. 1994).
8. MARY CLAY BERRY, THE ALASKAN PIPELINE: THE POLITICS OF OIL AND NATIVE LAND
CLAIMS 246-48 (1975).
9. City of Ketchikan v. Cape Fox Corp., 85 F.3d 1381, 1383 (9th Cir. 1996).
10. H.R. Rep. No. 92-523, at 3 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2192, 2194.
11. Martha Hirschfield, The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: Tribal Sovereignty and the
Corporate Form, 101 YALE L.J. 1331, 1332 (1992).
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oil and compelled Congress to provide a quick and final solution. Under
ANCSA, in an unusual congressional compensatory action, Alaskan Na-
tives received over forty million acres of land and nearly one billion dol-
lars in exchange for the abolishment of aboriginal land claims." ANCSA
then divided Alaska into twelve geographic regions based on cultural
differences, forming corresponding corporations owned by the local Na-
tives. 3 On a secondary level, ANCSA then similarly required that villag-
es within each of the regions to incorporate in order to facilitate organized
settlement. 4 Both regional and village corporations were to choose their
own lands, but curiously, on lands where the village corporations owned
the surface estate, the regional corporations would retain control over the
subsurface estate. 5 Many of the corporations selected land, mainly tun-
dra, for subsistence living purposes only, without considering possible
commercial opportunities."
Congress designed the unique corporate structure to govern the Alas-
kan Native lands in order to improve Native life,'7 but the results have
been disappointing. Many of the corporations have hovered near insolven-
cy, partly due to the vast amount of litigation concerning unclear provi-
sions of ANCSA. is Other problems have also plagued ANCSA and the
Native corporations. The money to be apportioned to the Native corpora-
tions was distributed within eleven years, so the fund of nearly one billion
dollars has long been depleted." Furthermore, the conveyance of Native
land has been very slow, and some corporations have faced losing the land
that they received in order to avoid bankruptcy.' Also, despite an initial
twenty-year prohibition against selling Native corporate stock, Native
control over their corporations has been threatened.2
12. 15 NEw ENCYCLOPEDIA BRrrANNIcA 23, 24 (15th ed. 1994).
13. Id. Seven of the regional corporations are Eskimo, one is Aleut, and the rest are Indian. A
thirteenth corporation includes Alaskan Natives outside of the state. Id
14. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1606-07 (1994).
15. 43 U.S.C. § 1611(a) (1994).
16. Thomas R. Berger, Village Journey: The Report of the Alaska Native Review Commission
33-35 (1985).
17. Hirschfield, supra note 11, at 1338. ANCSA was to be instituted in a manner consistent
"with the real economic and social needs" of the Alaskan Natives. 43 U.S.C. § 1601(b) (1994).
18. Hirschfield, supra note 11, at 1339.
19. Id. at 1332 & n.15.
20. Id at 1332. Fifteen years after ANCSA, the Native corporations had obtained patents for
less than 8% of their land. Id. at n.14.
21. Id& at 1332.
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III. BACKGROUND: A KODIAK FEUD
The Department of the Interior certified Leisnoi as a village corpora-
tion for the village of Woody Island in 1974.22 As a benefit of incorpora-
tion, ANCSA permitted Leisnoi to choose over 115,000 acres of public
land to manage with the condition that the subsurface would remain in the
control of the applicable regional corporation.' ANCSA allowed village
corporations to select the townships where their particular villages were
located as a portion of their allotted acres.2 4 Leisnoi stated in its applica-
tion for land that its Native village was located in two townships on the
western side of Woody Island. For its remaining acres, Leisnoi selected
additional land on Woody Island as well as on Kodiak and Long Is-
lands.' Woody Island, locally known as Leisnoi Island, is located in
Chiniak Bay, almost three miles east of Kodiak. Russians may have used
the island as early as 1792 as an agricultural colony, but it is now aban-
doned with most of the Natives living in Kodiak and Anchorage.26
Omar Stratman is an enigmatic figure. As a cattle rancher on Kodiak
Island, he held over 45,000 acres of grazing leases. Initially federal leases,
the Alaska Statehood Act transferred those leases to the state from the
federal government. Those leases were then transferred to Leisnoi through
part of its land entitlement under ANCSA.27 Stratman owned several hun-
dred head of cattle and operated a tourist lodge on his ranch east of Kodi-
ak. He has been characterized as a "homesteader with a reputation for
being ornery," and even he admitted that he is a "pretty stubborn individu-
al.",28 However, such descriptions do not adequately portray the Omar
Stratman who has waged a long and costly war with Leisnoi.
Incredibly, Omar Stratman's struggle with Leisnoi began over twenty
years ago. In 1976, he and other ranchers filed suit in federal district court
to prevent Leisnoi and other village corporations from receiving certain
land transfers under ANCSA.29 Even though Leisnoi's eligibility as a
village corporation was not directly challenged, the suit was recognized as
"decertification" litigation."0 In 1978, the district court dismissed the case
22. Id.
23. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1611, 1613 (1994).
24. Id.
25. Leisnoi, 154 F.3d at 1065.
26. Woody Island Alaska--I Love Alaska (visited March 27, 1999) <http:
//www.ilovealaska.com/alaskafWoodylsland/#history>.
27. Leisnoi, Inc. v. Stratman, 835 P.2d 1202, 1203-04 (Alaska 1992).
28. Tom Kizzia, Kodiak Land Tiff Still Burns After Almost Two Decades, Congress May Step
In Between Rancher, Native Corporation, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 4, 1995, at Al.
29. Leisnoi, 835 P.2d at 1204 (providing a detailed time line of the legal history between the
litigants prior to 1992).
30. Id.
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for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.31 However, the Ninth Cir-
cuit disagreed and the case was reinstated in 1981.32 Meanwhile, Leisnoi
and several other village corporations formed the regional corporation,
Koniag.33 Thus, Koniag began to negotiate with Stratman, but, in Decem-
ber 2, 1981, a former Leisnoi shareholder filed a derivative suit to set
aside the alliance with Koniag, an action which actually succeeded.' In
1982, Koniag and Stratman reached a settlement that became known as the
"Stratman Agreement," where Stratman set aside the "decertification" ac-
tion in return for certain land interests.35 By 1983, Leisnoi had separated
itself from Koniag and subsequently refused to honor the "Stratman
Agreement."36 Leisnoi and Omar Stratman again found themselves on
opposing sides of litigation, and the Alaska Supreme Court ruled in 1992
that the "Stratman Agreement" was unenforceable against Leisnoi.37
Stratman's case gained new life in December 1994, when the Ninth
Circuit ruled that he could reinstate his "decertification" action because of
the failure of the "Stratman Agreement."38 The renewed litigation sparked
a response in Congress that seemed to doom Stratman's "long, lonely
struggle against his Native landlord."39 The U.S. Senate sought to avoid
Stratman's argument that Leisnoi was fraudulently constructed around a
Native village that had ceased to exist long before ANCSA. Senator Frank
Murkowski from Alaska proposed to simply eliminate the controversy
with a legislative act legitimizing Leisnoi's position as a village corpora-
tion in order to stop the financial drain of the ongoing litigation.4' How-
ever, as the measure was presented, Leisnoi made "one of the great pub-
lic-relations blunders in the annals of the land claims act."'" The corpora-
tion imposed substantial fees on the use of its land for all of Kodiak's
residents.42 The public outcry was immediate and immense. The Kodiak
Island Borough Assembly passed a resolution against Leisnoi, and
Stratman found himself with overwhelming support.4 3 With an angry mob
suddenly backing Stratman, Murkowski's measure ultimately fizzled into nothing.'
31. Id.
32. Stratman v. Watt, 656 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1981).
33. Leisnoi, 835 P.2d at 1204.
34. Id. at 1205.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1206.
37. Id. at 1211.
38. Stratman v. Babbitt, 42 F.3d 1402 (9th Cir. 1994).





44. David Whitney, Long Fight Over Kodiak Land May End Without Clear Winner, ANCHOR-
174 PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20
In other areas, difficulties familiar to many ANCSA corporations
have become a dominant part of Leisnoi's history. The village corporation
represents Woody Island, a Native village just outside of Kodiak. Howev-
er, by 1970 the village had nearly vanished, and, according to Stratman,
its existence is ambiguous even prior to ANCSA.45 Furthermore, in 1995
half of Leisnoi's shareholders lived outside of Alaska, with only 21 per-
cent living on Kodiak Island. 6 In addition, the corporation has spent over
one million dollars on litigation, which includes legal fees associated with
internal fights.47 A new board of directors in 1994 even requested that the
Alaska State Troopers investigate the possibility of a misuse of funds.48
Still, Omar Stratman has ranked the highest on Leisnoi's list of tribula-
tions.
The preoccupation that Stratman and Leisnoi have had in regard to
each other seems to have developed into a permanent endeavor for re-
venge. Once, when a clerical error included Stratman's homestead on
Leisnoi's land, the corporation actually nailed an eviction notice to his
door.49 In addition to the unanswered questions concerning the "decertifi-
cation" action, the feuding parties have continued their battle in further
litigation.5"
Over recent years Leisnoi has been on the attack. Last year, before
the Alaskan Supreme Court, the corporation attempted to stop Stratman
from mining sand and gravel on land leased from the village." Leisnoi
argued that a permanent injunction instituted in 1996, which prohibited
Stratman from entering the leased land for his guided horseback and horse
rental operations, should apply to the mining operations." However, the
Alaskan Supreme Court found that the injunction concerning the grazing
leases was inapplicable to mining. 3 Recently, Leisnoi has renewed its
AGE DAILY NEWS. Sept. 30, 1995, at BI.





50. See Stratman v. Leisnoi, Inc., 969 P.2d 1139 (Alaska 1998). Leisnoi wanted to sell a piece
of land known as Termination Point to the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustees. Stratman recorded a lis
pendens against Leisnoi's lands and disrupted the conveyance. Leisnoi brought a quiet title action
against Stratman and the superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the corporation. How-
ever, the Alaskan Supreme Court vacated the decision and ordered a stay until the outcome of the
pending "decertification" litigation in front of the Interior Board of Land Appeals. See also Leisnoi,
Inc. v. United States, No. 97-36006, 1999 WL 147368 (9th Cir. Mar. 19, 1999). Leisnoi also brought a
quiet title action against the United States, but the federal district court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction
since no dispute existed with the federal government. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id.
51. Leisnoi, Inc. v. Stratman, 956 P.2d 452 (Alaska 1998).
52. Id. at 453.
53. Id. at 455.
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efforts and has brought a forcible entry and detainer action, alleging that
Stratman broke several provisions of the grazing leases.' Furthermore,
the litigation surrounding Stratman's mining operations has continued in
the present case, following this long history of fighting that has made
Leisnoi and Stratman "avowed enemies.""
One month after the 1996 injunction against his horse operations
became effective, Omar Stratman began the disputed extraction of sand
and gravel from Leisnoi's land. 6 Koniag, the regional corporation of Ko-
diak Island, retained the subsurface rights to the land selected by
Leisnoi 7 Stratman received from Koniag, through a quitclaim deed, the
sand and gravel rights for a portion of land located approximately twelve
miles from Woody Island and began his mining activity there in July
1996. Concerned about damage to the surface estate and the possible
destruction of buried artifacts, Leisnoi insisted that Stratman needed its
permission to proceed and filed for injunctive relief in federal district
court.5 Leisnoi's legal arguments contested the regional corporation's
authority to permit the extraction of sand and gravel.59 Therefore,
Stratman had symbolically "stepped into Koniag's shoes" for this dual
ownership conflict.' Upon a Rule 12(b)(6) motion by Stratman, the fed-
eral district court dismissed the case.6 Leisnoi then appealed the decision
to the Ninth Circuit.62
IV. OTHER "DuAL OWNERSHIP" CASE LAW
With a mocking tone, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Leisnoi
v. Stratman commented that the concept of dual ownership in ANCSA
created a continuous issue for litigation. 63 Bifurcating the surface estate
from the subsurface seems to be a simple enough notion, but hidden ambi-
guities generate ample controversy for both state and federal courts. The
Ninth Circuit has had the opportunity to address dual ownership litigation
prior to Leisnoi v. Stratman. As the following cases illustrate, whether
sand and gravel are surface or subsurface estates has been a prevalent
54. Leisnoi, Inc. v. Stratman, 906 P.2d 14 (Alaska 1998).
55. Leisnoi, 154 F.3d at 1065.
56. Leisnoi, 956 P.2d at 453.
57. Leisnoi, 154 F.3d at 1065.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1066-70. Leisnoi also sued under the Archaeological Resources Protection Act and
the National Environmental Policy Act. These claims were similarly dismissed by the federal district
court, but were not appealed. ld. at n.5.
60. Id. at 1065.
61. Leisnoi, Inc. v. Stratman, No. A96-0361-CV (D. Alaska Jul. 3, 1997).
62. Leisnoi, Inc. v. Stratman, 154 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 1998).
63. 1l The court characterizes this case as "yet another chapter" in an "ongoing saga." I
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issue.
As early as 1976, in Aleut Corporation v. Arctic Slope, the federal
district court of Alaska reviewed whether sand and gravel are considered
surface or subsurface resources under ANCSA.64 Aleut arose out of a dis-
pute between various regional corporations regarding sharing subsurface
resources.65 ANCSA requires each regional corporation to distribute sev-
enty percent of the revenue received from its granted subsurface and tim-
ber resources among all of the regional corporations.66 The pertinent
question for regional corporations became whether sand and gravel are
categorized as surface or subsurface resources under ANCSA.
In examining the issue, the district court realized that any classifica-
tion would affect the relationship between regional and village corpora-
tions.67 The extraction of sand and gravel requires open pit mining which
destroys the surface estate. Without a specific provision in ANCSA, the
court found that it was "implausible" that Congress intended sand and
gravel to be part of the subsurface where village corporations were in-
volved.68 Based on "this policy consideration," the court refused to classi-
fy sand and gravel as part of the subsurface estate in dually owned
lands.69 However, the court recognized that approximately half of the
Native surface land distributed under ANCSA was conveyed solely to the
regional corporations, and considerations of dual ownership are irrelevant
in such circumstances.70 Thus, the court reasoned that sand and gravel
should be classified as a subsurface resource where there is not a separate
surface interest but as a surface resource when village corporations are
involved.7
The Ninth Circuit first opportunity to interpret sand and gravel dis-
putes between regional and village corporations came in Chugach Natives
v. Doyson." Chugach Natives was a consolidated appeal of several dis-
trict court opinions addressing the classification of sand and gravel based
on dual ownership, including Aleut. The district court in Aleut had inter-
preted ANCSA in a "somewhat anomalous" decision by finding two dif-
ferent meanings for the term "subsurface."73 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
64. Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg'l Corp., 421 F. Supp. 862 (Alaska 1976).
65. Id. at 864. The dispute began initially with five regional corporations suing another seven
regional corporations in regard to the requirements of sharing revenue. See Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope
Reg'l Corp., 410 F. Supp. 1196 (Alaska 1976).
66. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(i) (1994).
67. Aleut Corp, 421 F. Supp. at 864.
68. Id. at 866.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 867.
71. Id.
72. Chugach Natives, Inc. v. Doyson, Ltd., 588 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1979).
73. Id. at 725 (quoting Aleut, 421 F. Supp. at 867). The district court admitted that its decision
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struggled with the lower court's definition. In their opinion in Chugach
Natives, the court thoroughly examined the relevant legislative history of
ANCSA. Koniag, the regional corporation later associated with Leisnoi
and Omar Stratman, firmly argued that sand and gravel should be recog-
nized as a subsurface resource in every situation. Koniag based its position
on the development of federal public land law in regard to minerals.74
The Ninth Circuit ultimately remained unconvinced that classifying sand
and gravel solely as part of the subsurface estate would harm village cor-
porations.' In making this determination, the court rested its decision on
the relevant value of sand and gravel.76 ANCSA requires regional corpo-
rations to share the revenues obtained from subsurface mining with other
regional corporations in order to lessen the effect of uneven resource dis-
tribution. Sand and gravel are only valuable when located near developing
areas, and classifying such resources as part of the surface would only en-
rich corporations located near population centers.77 The court in Chugach
Natives admitted that there was "no readily ascertainable answer" to the
problem of classifying sand and gravel, but failed to find any persuasive
argument to provide a surface exception where village corporations were
involved."
In 1988, the Ninth Circuit again had the opportunity to reexamine
surface rights associated with sand and gravel in Tyonek v. Cook Inlet.79
In Tyonek, a village corporation brought a declaratory judgment action
against a regional corporation in order to define the relationship of sand
and gravel to the surface estate. Tyonek asserted that sand and gravel are
naturally attached to the surface estate." Chugach Natives seemed to be
controlling precedent, but Tyonek argued that Chugach Natives only ap-
plied to lands completely owned by regional corporations and not to dual-
ly owned lands." However, the Ninth Circuit refused to distinguish
seemed to be unusual. Il
74. Il at 727-28. After determining that the "subsurface estate" included the "mineral estate,"
Koniag referred to the 1955 amendment to federal mining law at 30 U.S.C. §§ 601-15 (1976). Sand
and gravel were specifically excluded from the definition of valuable minerals. However, according to
Koniag, they still remained minerals in general. In support, the Sealaska Regional Corporation cited a
Department of Interior decision which recognized both "common" and "uncommon" varieties of min-
erals under federal law. Id. at 728 & nn.14-15 (citing United States v. United States Minerals Dev.
Corp., 75 Interior Dec. 127 (1968) (expressly approved by McClarty v. Secretary of Interior, 408 F.2d
907 (9th Cir. 1968)).
75. L at 73 1-32.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. ld. at 732.
79. Tyonek Native Corp. v. Cook Inlet Reg'l, Inc., 853 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1988).
80. Id. at 728-29.
81. Ld. at 729. 0
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Chugach Natives, and instead affirmed that the case governed all sand and
gravel classification disputes. 2 In a further effort, Tyonek argued for a
favorable application of an amendment to ANCSA, which Congress had
adopted after Chugach Natives.83 Specifically, ANCSA as amended states
that village corporations can retain revenue from certain surface resources
"extracted" from village lands.84 Tyonek argued that "extracted" referred
to sand and gravel. In disagreement, the court examined the relevant legis-
lative history and found that the amendment to ANCSA did not affect the
holding in Chugach Natives."
However, sand and gravel disputes between regional and village
corporations continued to generate litigation before the Ninth Circuit.
Following Chugach Natives and Tyonek, the court decided two additional
sand and gravel cases: Shee Atika v. Sealaska86 and Koniag v. Koncor.87
In Shee Atika, the regional corporation, Sealaska, sought to enjoin unau-
thorized use of sand and gravel from its subsurface estate. As an urban
corporation,88 Shee Atika owned several acres of surface estate and
brought an action for declaratory judgment allowing it to use sand and
gravel from the subsurface free of charge. The Ninth Circuit simply re-
ferred to its "contemporaneous decision" in Koniag and ruled that the
subsurface estate is burdened by the ability of surface owners to reason-
ably use the sand and gravel for development.89
In Koniag, the Ninth Circuit examined the issue posed in Shee Atika
in greater detail. In Koniag, the regional corporation appeared once again
entangled in a sand and gravel dispute. Koniag brought the action to ob-
tain an injunction to stop a partnership of village corporations from using
subsurface rock. The court promptly related its conclusions from Tyonek,
but claimed that the issue of subsurface use by a village corporation had
been "left open."9
According to the Ninth Circuit, Congress created the corporate struc-
ture of ANCSA to facilitate the land and money grants to the Natives of
Alaska.9 Nearly 22 million acres were patented to village corpora-
tions.92 Koncor existed to harvest timber on the lands of the participating
82. Id.
83. Id. at 729-30.
84. 43 U.S.C. § 1613(c) (1994).
85. Tyonek, 853 F.2d at 729-30.
86. Shee Atika v. Sealaska Corp., 39 F.3d 247 (9th Cir. 1994).
87. Koniag, Inc. v. Koncor Forest Resource, 39 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 1994).
88. ANCSA established urban corporations, akin to village corporations, that own surface lands
as opposed to the subsurface. 43 U.S.C. § 1613(h) (1994).
89. Shee Atika, 39 F.3d at 248-49.
90. Koniag, 39 F.3d at 995.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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village corporations and had used rock from the subsurface estate for road
building in order to conduct its logging operations.93 Koncor claimed that
in order to access its timber resources, rock and gravel were needed to
build roads, and the local subsurface, owned by Koniag, was the only
practical source.' Therefore, Koncor argued that when the regional cor-
poration received the subsurface estate, Congress implied that village
corporations would have the right to use materials necessary to build
roads.9" By looking at various factors, including congressional intent and
the necessity of road construction, the Ninth Circuit agreed that the sub-
surface estates were burdened by an implied servitude.96
However, the Ninth Circuit qualified its decision that Koniag could
not unreasonably deny Koncor the necessary rock. According to the court,
such reasonable access to subsurface resources must be accompanied by
reasonable payment.97 The court reasoned that since regional corporations
are required to redistribute part of the income received from subsurface
resources, to allow village corporations free access would undermine the
policy of ANCSA."
After Koniag, certain resources under ANCSA, like rock, sand, and
gravel, had achieved a unique status. Regional corporations clearly owned
the resources as part of the subsurface estate. Village corporations, howev-
er, could use the resources when it was necessary, as long as the regional
corporations received adequate compensation.
V. ANALYSIS OF LEISNoI V. STRATMAN
Leisnoi v. Stratman represents another step in the evolution of sand
and gravel on dually owned lands in Alaska. The case illustrates that
ANCSA contains vague provisions that allow interpretation based on the
situation and, unfortunately, also allow endless litigation. Specifically,
ANCSA restricts regional corporations by empowering village corporations
with the right to refuse mineral exploration and mining within "the bound-
aries" of a village."
Leisnoi objected to Stratman's extraction of gravel, which was specif-
ically authorized by Koniag, by alleging that the mining activity was with-
93. Id.
94. IL at 996.
95. IL
96. Id. at 996-98.
97. Il at 998-99.
98. d.
99. 43 U.S.C. § 1613(f) (1994). ANCSA states that the right "to explore, develop, or remove
minerals from the subsurface estate in the land within the boundaries of any Native village shall be
subject to the consent of the Village Corporation." AL
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in the boundaries of the Native village, Woody Island. Leisnoi asserted
that the land within the boundaries of a village includes all land that the
relevant village corporation received under ANCSA, or as an alternative,
all land that the village historically used. Such interpretations would effec-
tively include the land containing Stratman's mining efforts. Stratman, in
response, contended that the boundaries of a village should be delineated
by actual physical structures."° Stratman's reasoning would favor the
gravel operation since the village of Woody Island seems to have ceased
to exist in any permanent form.'
A. Village Boundaries as Enclosing Corporate Land
The Ninth Circuit first examined Leisnoi's contention that the bound-
aries of a Native village match the boundaries of all of the land granted to
the relevant village corporation under ANCSA. The court began by prob-
ing the substance of ANCSA around the critical phrase allowing a village
corporation to deny mining operations on "lands within the boundaries of
any Native village."' 2 After examining the statute, the court noted that
Congress used divergent phrases when explaining corporate lands and
lands within the boundaries of a Native village. From such evidence, the
court hypothesized that Congress did not intend for corporate lands to be
included within the boundaries of a Native village. 3 Other sections of
ANCSA support the possibility by drawing further distinctions, and the
court finally concluded that "the text of ANCSA draws a clear distinction
between the lands patented to the Village Corporation and the boundaries
of the Native village."'"
B. Village Boundaries as Denoted by Historical Use
The Ninth Circuit continued its analysis by examining Leisnoi's alter-
native assertion that the boundaries of a Native village should enclose
areas historically used by the relevant village.' The court addressed this
contention by turning to an interpretive regulation promulgated by the
Secretary of the Interior." 6 In order for a village corporation to receive
100. Leisnoi, 154 F.3d at 1066.
101. See Woody Island Alaska--I Love Alaska, supra note 26; see also Kizzia, supra note 28, at
Al (explaining the uncertain existence of Woody Island even before ANCSA).
102. Leisnoi, 154 F.3d at 1066 (referring to the statute codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1613(f) (1994)).
103. Id at 1067.
104. Id. at 1068. The court expressly examined the section of ANCSA which allows village cor-
porations to select the land of their choice. The section administers land where the relevant village is
located plus additional acreage. Id. (referring to the statute codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1611 (1994)).
105. Id.
106. Id. (referring to the regulation codified at 43 C.F.R. § 2651.2(b)(2) (1998)). The Secretary
of the Interior examines signs of "occupancy consistent with the Natives' own cultural patterns and
TRIBAL LAND QUARRELS IN ALASKA
land under ANCSA, it must meet certain criteria. The regulation states that
one of the requirements is that the relevant village must have "an identifi-
able physical location."'"° The court concluded that, because the Secre-
tary identifies the location of Native villages by signs of occupancy, the
boundaries of such a village must be in reference to physical evidence of
habitation."' 5 The court also acknowledged deference to the Secretary of
the Interior because of his responsibility to administer ANCSA and re-
fused to ignore his interpretation unless unreasonable or inconsistent with
the intent of Congress. 9
Leisnoi specifically asserted that the Secretary's interpretation of a
Native village as evidenced by occupancy was inconsistent with congres-
sional intent."' ANCSA uses the word "community" to refer to a Native
village. Leisnoi contended, therefore, historic hunting and fishing grounds
should be included."' However, the court used a different definition of
community meaning a "people with common interests living in a particular
area."112 Having disposed with the congressional intent issue, the court
moved on in evaluating the reasonableness of the Secretary's interpreta-
tion.
Leisnoi challenged the reasonableness of the interpretation on several
grounds. To begin with, Leisnoi does not even control the portion of the
land where the actual village structures of Woody Island are located, since
they lie within the vicinity of the City of Kodiak."3 Leisnoi argued that,
therefore, it would not have the power to withhold consent anywhere. The
court quickly dismissed this claim, however, by stating that "perfection is
not to be expected from a statutory scheme like ANCSA.. ' . 4 Leisnoi
next examined the legislative history to challenge the reasonableness of
the Secretary's interpretation of a Native village. The relevant House Re-
port states that mining within the boundaries of a Native village is depen-
dent on the consent of the village corporation in order to preserve the use
of the land "in accordance with traditional local life-styles and subsistence
economy."".. The court readily dismissed this argument too by claiming
life style." Id.
107. Id. Stratman contended that Woody Island ceased to physically exist long before the cre-
ation of ANCSA. Kizzia, supra note 28, at Al.
108. Leisnoi, 154 F.3d at 1068.
109. Id. (applying Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984)).
110. L
111. Id. at 1069 (referring to the statute codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1602(c) (1994)).
112. Id. (quoting Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 267 (1986)).
113. Id. at 1070. A village corporation cannot control land within two miles of the boundary of
any "home rule" city. 43 C.F.R. § 2650.6(a) (1998).
114. Leisnoi, 154 F.3d at 1070.
115. H.R. No. 94-729, at 26 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2376, 2393.
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that the report was ambiguous, and, in any event, legislative history "as a
tool for statutory interpretation suffers from a host of infirmities.""' 6 In
its last effort, Leisnoi contended that the Secretary's position violates a
policy of economic improvement. " 7 Leisnoi drew a picture of the foun-
dations of homes collapsing due to subsurface exploration, curtailing
housing growth beyond the current occupancy of the village. The court
refused to delve into property law, though, and simply noted the possi-
bility for contracts between surface and subsurface owners.
In the end, the Ninth Circuit disregarded all of Leisnoi's arguments
and firmly defined village boundaries by occupancy." 8 Based on this
conclusion, the court examined whether the village of Woody Island was
located on Kodiak Island where Stratman extracted sand and gravel. It
found that the village was not located there pursuant to the information in-
cluded in Leisnoi's original application for land to the Secretary of the
Interior. Further, nobody suggested that the village had somehow expand-
ed. Therefore, since Stratman received permission from Koniag, he did not
need further authority from Leisnoi to proceed with his mining because
the activity was located outside of the boundaries of Woody Island as
defined by the occupancy of its residents."9
VI. CONCLUSION
Leisnoi made a strong attempt to expand the boundaries of Woody
Island and thwart its nemesis, Omar Stratman. The Ninth Circuit quickly
dismissed all of Leisnoi's arguments in finding for Stratman, and the
dismissals were not always accompanied with satisfactory explanations.
Specifically, the court haphazardly ignored the legislative history even
though it seemed to support Leisnoi's stance. However, the utilization of
common sense rejects Leisnoi's arguments even faster. Realistically, the
boundaries of a village cannot encompass thousands of acres belonging to
a corporation. The real dilemma lies in the provisions of ANCSA that do
not adequately take into consideration the essence of Native life.
Most criticisms of ANCSA center on the fact that Congress produced
a complex corporate structure without taking into account Alaskan life-
style. In fact, information available to Congress depicted Alaskan Natives
as people in poverty surviving mainly on subsistence activities,"' which
accounts for Leisnoi's argument that the boundaries of a Native village
116. Leisnoi, 154 F.3d at 1070.
117. Id. at 1071.
118. Id. at 1071.
119. Id. at 1072.
120. Marilyn J. Ward Ford, Indian Country and Inherent Tribal Authority: Will They Survive
ANCSA?, 14 ALASKA L. REv. 443, 450 (1997).
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should include historic hunting grounds. Also, Congress realized that most
Natives were completely unexposed to corporate and business con-
cepts."' ANCSA required such uninitiated people to organize multiple
corporations, meet important deadlines, and deal with land issues.' 2 Ob-
viously, Alaskan Natives have had difficulty adjusting.
Besides the awkward imposition of a foreign corporate system on the
people of Alaska, the dual land ownership regime has contributed to the
troubles of ANCSA. In particular, disputes over sand and gravel use alone
have generated much litigation over the last twenty years. Leisnoi v.
Stratman confirmed the authority of regional corporations, like Koniag, to
effectively control sand and gravel mining in Alaska. Further disputes in
this area may be possible, though, considering the intricacies of ANCSA.
However, it is the perpetual saga between Leisnoi and Omar Stratman that
epitomizes all of the struggles inherent within ANCSA. Yet, despite these
multitudes of problems, Congress may have developed a scheme as work-
able as any other possibility to achieve its goals. Economic and industrial
development of Alaska called for clear land titles. With ANCSA, Congress
simply wanted to impose the modem world on Alaska in an instantaneous
fashion. Such an immediate clash between contemporary law and society
with a remote and primeval land like Alaska inevitably leads to disruption.
121. 1M
122. Id at 470 n.44.
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